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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MICHIGAN V. EPA: INTERSTATE OZONE POLLUTION AND EPA’S
“NOX SIP CALL”

PATRICIA ROSS McCUBBIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, faced with mounting evidence that states along the eastern
seaboard could not comply with national air quality standards for ozone
pollution due, in part, to emissions originating in upwind states,1 the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a highly controversial rule, the
“NOx SIP Call,” requiring twenty-three states to reduce their emissions.2 For
the first time, EPA had initiated an attempt under the federal Clean Air Act3 to

* J.D., B.A., University of Virginia. Professor McCubbin is an assistant professor at the Southern
Illinois University School of Law in Carbondale, Illinois, where she teaches several
environmental law courses. Prior to joining the faculty at Southern Illinois University, she was
an attorney with the Environmental Defense Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, where she
served as co-counsel for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in Michigan v. EPA, 213
F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2001) (No. 00-632). She
wishes to thank Matthew Goetten for his helpful research for this article.
1. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62
Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,322 (Nov. 7, 1997) (proposed “NOx SIP Call”) (“States generally were not
able to meet [the deadlines for complying with national air quality standards for ozone
because] . . . States were not able to address or control transport [of ozone pollution].”). See also
Jason S. Grumet, Old West Justice: Federalism and Clean Air Regulation 1970-1998, 11 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 375, 398-99 (1998) (while scientists have known about the long-range transport of
ozone since at least the 1970’s, information was not made available and understandable to the
state regulatory community until the 1997 Ozone Transport Assessment Group study).
2. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63
Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (final NOx SIP Call). For an explanation of the terms “NOx”
and “SIP Call,” see infra text accompanying notes 8 & 17. Technically, the NOx SIP Call
regulates twenty-two states and the District of Columbia but for simplicity this article refers to the
regulated entities as “twenty-three states.” Those twenty-three states are found in the midwest,
southeast and northeast and are: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,358.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1999).
47
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reduce “interstate ozone pollution,” that is, ozone carried by the prevailing
winds from one state to another.
Unprecedented in nature and affecting nearly half the nation, the NOx SIP
Call was challenged by eight of the twenty-three upwind states along with
dozens of industries.4 They argued two key issues in the case: first, that EPA
had improperly identified which upwind states’ emissions were responsible for
interstate ozone pollution; and, second, that EPA had violated states’ rights
under the cooperative federalism mandated by the Clean Air Act.5 On March 3,
2000, however, in Michigan v. EPA, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the rule in all major
respects.6 To explain the importance of this complex case, which will give
EPA greater authority to regulate interstate air pollution in the future,
presented below are an overview of the NOx SIP Call and analyses of the two
key issues in the Michigan decision.7

4. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W.
3297 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2001) (No. 00-632). The state petitioners were: Michigan, Ohio, Indiana,
West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Alabama. The state of Wisconsin
intervened as a petitioner. Id. at 668. Some of the petitioning industries were Appalachian Power
Company, the United Mine Workers of America, and the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners.
See Joint Common Issues Brief of Industry/Labor Petitioners, Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1497); Brief of Petitioner Council of Industrial Boiler Owners,
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1497).
Several northeastern states intervened on EPA’s behalf, including New York,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, as did several industries from those states, as well as the
Province of Ontario and the federal government of Canada, and several environmental groups.
213 F.3d at 668-69.
5. Id. at 674-79, 685-88. See infra text accompanying notes 24-105 (analyzing these two
issues in more detail).
6. 213 F.3d at 669.
7. In addition to the two primary issues discussed in this article, the Michigan court agreed
with EPA on several other issues, including that: (1) EPA did not have to convene a transport
commission under sections 176A and 184 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506a & 7511c
(1994), before issuing the NOx SIP Call (213 F.3d at 671-73); (2) EPA’s modeling was sufficient
to identify the significant contributions from specific upwind states (id. at 673-74); (3) the rule
did not conflict with earlier EPA decisions that certain upwind contributions did not violate the
pre-1990 version of the good neighbor provision (Clean Air Act, § 110(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(2)(E) (1988)) (213 F.3d at 674); (4) EPA reasonably imposed uniform control
requirements on all the states subject to the rule, rather than varying the controls based on
geographic considerations (id. at 679-80); (5) the state of South Carolina was appropriately
included in the rule (id. at 685); (6) EPA did not violate the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 601-612 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), by certifying that the rule would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities (213 F.3d at 688-89); and (7) EPA
reasonably defined the main sources that could participate in the rule’s NOx emissions trading
program (id. at 689-90).
The court held against EPA when it found that the states of Wisconsin, Missouri and
Georgia were included in the NOx SIP Call on improper grounds. Id. at 681-85.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE NOX SIP CALL
Ground-level ozone pollution, commonly referred to as “smog,” forms
when nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) interact
with sunlight in the earth’s atmosphere.8 NOx and VOCs are emitted by
thousands of diverse sources across the country. Coal-burning power plants
are emissions sources, but so too are such smaller sources as gasoline
distributors, diesel engines and automobiles.9
Because the transformation of NOx and VOCs into ozone occurs in the
atmosphere where prevailing westerly winds can carry the pollutants over great
distances,10 several northeastern–and therefore downwind–states repeatedly
had urged EPA to require upwind states to impose greater controls on NOx and
VOC emissions.11 Although ozone is one of six air pollutants for which EPA
has promulgated “national ambient air quality standards,”12 EPA had been

The court also considered several other issues specific to industrial boilers, rejecting all
but the claim that EPA failed to give proper notice of its definition of an “electricity generating
unit.” Id. at 691-93. The court also agreed with a petitioner that EPA did not give proper notice
of the control level it assumed for large stationary internal combustion engines. Finally, the court
rejected two narrow claims brought by an electric utility regarding “early reduction credits” and
“low mass emission units.” Id. at 693-95.
8. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,359.
9. Grumet, supra note 1, at 378.
10. 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,333. See also Grumet, supra note 1, at 381 (scientific studies have
concluded that ozone may be caused by emissions hundreds of miles away).
11. Grumet, supra note 1, at 396 and notes 72-73 (describing New York’s 1989 request that
EPA take action against ozone transport); id. at 387-88 (describing petitions to EPA by eight
northeastern states asking for regulation of upwind NOx emissions). See also Vickie L. Patton,
The New Air Quality Standards, Regional Haze and Interstate Air Pollution Transport, 28
ENVTL. L. REP. 10155, 10166 n.89 (1998) (describing repeated efforts by New York, Connecticut
and other northeastern states to force EPA to impose additional requirements on midwestern
sources to reduce emissions of another transported pollutant, sulfur dioxide).
12. National ambient air quality standards prescribe the maximum acceptable level of the
pollutant in our ambient air. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9-.10 (1999) (standards for ozone). Id. at pt. 50
(standards for particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide and lead). In
1979, EPA promulgated the original “primary” standard for ozone, which set the permissible
level of ozone in the ambient air at 0.12 parts per million (ppm), averaged over one-hour intervals
(sometimes referred to as the “one-hour standard”). 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1979). In 1997, EPA
promulgated a new, more stringent primary ozone standard as a companion to the older standard.
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.10). EPA reduced the maximum allowable level of ozone in the
ambient air to 0.08 ppm averaged over an eight-hour interval (the “eight-hour standard”). Id. at
38,858, 38,861-62.
In addition to “primary” standards designed to protect the public health, EPA also sets
“secondary” standards designed to protect the public welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)(2) (1994).
In 1997, EPA set the “secondary” ozone standard at the same level as the primary standard. 62
Fed. Reg. at 38,874-75.
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reluctant to intercede in the states’ disputes over interstate ozone pollution.13
However, with broader regulatory power granted by Congress in 1990,14 and
with scientific evidence indicating that states along the eastern seaboard could
not comply with the air quality standards for ozone,15 EPA announced a plan,
in 1997, to determine whether any upwind states should be required, through a
“SIP Call,” to reduce their emissions.16
Under the Clean Air Act, in order comply with air quality standards set by
EPA, each state must develop a State Implementation Plan, or SIP, identifying
which emissions sources the state will regulate and by what degree.17 EPA
must review and approve a state’s SIP and, after doing so, may “call” the SIP
to require its revision if it fails to comply with all the relevant provisions of the
Clean Air Act.18 To regulate interstate ozone pollution, EPA planned to call the
SIPs of certain upwind states and require them to reduce their NOx emissions.
This “NOx SIP Call” would be issued pursuant to section 110(a)(2)(D) of the
Clean Air Act, which requires each state to ensure that emissions from its

13. See Patton, supra note 11, at 10156 (“Since the adoption of the 1970 Clean Air Act, . . .
EPA has resisted restrictions on downwind pollution transport or allocating emissions reduction
responsibilities among states to address transboundary pollution.”); id. at 10166-72 (describing
EPA’s repeated denials of requests by downwind states for regulation of upwind sources);
Grumet, supra note 1, at 385 (“By refusing to employ [its] authority [to control interstate air
pollution], the EPA has until now perpetuated the paradigm of local responsibility set forth in the
1970 [Clean Air] Act.”).
14. In 1990 Congress strengthened the good neighbor provision now found in section
110(a)(2)(D) and, before 1990, found in section 110(a)(2)(E). 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (1988).
The pre-1990 version only prohibited emissions from “any stationary source within the [upwind]
State . . . which will . . . prevent attainment or maintenance [of the air quality standards] by any
other State.” Id. (emphasis added). In 1990, Congress revised the provision to focus not only on
stationary sources, but also “other type[s] of emissions activities” within an upwind state (such as
automobiles), and to prohibit emissions that “contribute significantly” to downwind
nonattainment, even if those emissions were not the sole cause of (i.e., “prevented”)
nonattainment in another state. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994). See Richard L. Revesz,
Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2360-61 (1996)
(summarizing changes made in 1990 to the good neighbor provision); Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New
England and the Challenge of Interstate Ozone Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1996) (explaining difficulties in implementing the pre-1990
version of the good neighbor provision).
15. Grumet, supra note 1, at 389 (referring to “improved scientific knowledge among policy
makers” and “changes in the 1990 [Clean Air Act] Amendments” as contributing to EPA’s
willingness to issue the NOx SIP Call, as well as “changing politics” and “the growing
competition between electric utilities”).
16. Calls for State Implementation Plan Revisions for Certain States To Reduce Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 1420 (Jan. 10, 1997).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990).
18. See id. § 7410(k)(5). Prior to 1990, EPA’s authority to require a state to revise its SIP
was implied from section 110(a)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H) (1977). See Virginia v. EPA,
108 F.3d 1397, 1407 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds, 116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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pollution sources do not contribute significantly to pollutant levels in another
state.19
To issue the NOx SIP Call pursuant to section 110(a)(2)(D), EPA faced
enormous challenges. EPA had to determine not only which states’ emissions
were contributing to ozone levels in distant downwind states (and to what
degree), but also had to define which emissions would be considered
“significant,” for nowhere does the Clean Air Act define the phrase “contribute
significantly” or provide any guidance for its interpretation.20 In addition, EPA
had to develop a regulatory mechanism that would force the states to reduce
their emissions while, at the same time, leaving each state the flexibility to
choose which pollution control measures to adopt in order to obtain the
necessary reductions.21
To meet these challenges, EPA took two innovative steps. First, EPA
developed a definition of “contribute significantly,” based not only on the
amount of ozone an upwind state contributed to downwind areas, but also on
what types of pollution sources were found in the state and whether affordable
pollution controls were available for those sources.22 Second, to prescribe the
emissions reductions required of the states, EPA assigned to each state an
“emissions budget,” that is, a cap on the total amount of NOx emissions
permitted from that state.23 A discussion of these controversial steps, vital to
understanding the Michigan case, follows.
III. AIR QUALITY, CONTROL COSTS AND “CONTRIBUTING SIGNIFICANTLY”
A.

The Good Neighbor Provision Of Section 110(a)(2)(D)

EPA issued the NOx SIP Call pursuant to section 110(a)(2)(D) of the Clean
Air Act,24 the “good neighbor provision,”25 which requires each state to
include provisions in its SIP prohibiting:
any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from emitting
any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly to
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with
respect to any . . . national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard.26

19. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1990).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 24-56. Referring to “states’ emissions” does not
mean only emissions from state-owned or state-operated sources, and instead means emissions
from all sources–public and private–in the state.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 80-86.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 24-56.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 80-86.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1994).
25. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,366.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1990) (emphasis added). See supra text of note 12.
(describing primary and secondary standards). For an explanation of how the current version of
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Although this provision clearly prohibits a state from emitting pollutants in
amounts that will “contribute significantly” to another state’s “nonattainment,”
that is, its inability to comply with air quality standards set by EPA, the statute
does not define, quantitatively or otherwise, what is meant by “contribute
significantly,” nor does it detail the methods to be used to identify which
upwind emissions from one state might be contributing significantly to another
state. EPA began, therefore, to develop its interpretation of section
110(a)(2)(D) by first turning to sophisticated air quality modeling data then
available.27
B.

EPA’s Preliminary Determinations Based On Air Quality Modeling Data

For the NOx SIP Call, EPA relied heavily on air quality modeling data
provided by the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG). In 1995, in
order to study interstate ozone pollution and develop strategies to reduce its
transport from one state to another, thirty-seven states east of the Rockies
joined together to create OTAG.28 For two years, using state-of-the-art
techniques, OTAG studied the complex science of ozone transport and
concluded that reducing upwind NOx emissions would reduce ozone levels in
downwind regions, even in downwind regions several hundred miles away.29
the good neighbor provision reflects improvements made by Congress in 1990, see supra text of
note 14.
Section 110(a)(2)(D) not only focuses on upwind state emissions that contribute
significantly to downwind nonattainment, but also emissions that interfere with a downwind
state’s ability to maintain its already-established compliance with the air quality standards. EPA,
however, did not focus on this aspect of the good neighbor provision, and instead focused on
emissions that “contribute significantly” to downwind nonattainment. 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,326.
27. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,381-83 (describing the major findings from the Ozone Transport
Assessment Group technical analyses). See also Michigan, 213 F.3d at 673 (describing EPA’s
technical analyses).
28. Ozone Transport Assessment Group Executive Report (1997) [hereinafter OTAG
Executive Report] (on file with Public Law Review); 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,319-20. EPA, industry,
and environmental representatives also participated in OTAG’s proceedings. OTAG Executive
Report, at 3.
29. OTAG Executive Report, supra note 28, at 4, 30-32 (describing regional NOx emissions
reductions as effective in producing reduced ozone levels throughout the OTAG states, though
recognizing that NOx reductions have the greatest benefit in the immediate area where the
reductions occur). See also 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,377 (presenting OTAG’s findings that “[r]egional
NOx reductions are effective in producing ozone benefits” and “[a]ir quality data documents the
widespread and pervasive nature of ozone and indicates transport of ozone”) (emphasis added);
63 Fed. Reg. at 57,396 (describing, for example, Illinois’ contribution to ozone nonattainment in
New York City).
As previously noted, NOx and VOCs combine to form ozone. See supra text
accompanying note 8. OTAG found, however, that reducing emissions of VOCs would only help
reduce ozone levels in the immediate locales where the VOCs are created, which usually are
major urban areas, and would not help alleviate ozone in distant downwind states. OTAG
Executive Report, supra note 28, at 30; 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,332, 60,377 (summarizing OTAG’s
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Although its studies provided considerable long-range ozone transport data,30
OTAG did not determine which upwind states were the most substantial
contributors to downwind ozone pollution.31 (This was due, in part, to OTAG’s
use of modeling that examined emissions, not from any individual state, but
from upwind regional groups of states),32 OTAG also did not determine which
pollution control measures an upwind region should adopt in order to reduce
its NOx emissions,33 but instead recommended that the states conduct further
studies.34
In addition to relying on OTAG’s studies, EPA also conducted its own
more detailed modeling that focused on state-by-state, rather than regional,
analyses.35 This modeling predicted the impact of upwind emissions on
downwind ozone levels using three measures: (1) the absolute magnitude of
the ozone contribution from an upwind state to a downwind state; (2) the
relative magnitude of the upwind state’s contribution compared to the
downwind state’s ozone level; and (3) the frequency of the contributions.36
With this air quality modeling data in hand, EPA then turned to the
difficult task of determining which upwind emissions were contributing

recommendations). This is so because many VOCs are emitted from natural sources such as trees
and plants. Thus, even if all man-made VOCs were eliminated, NOx emissions could still interact
with natural VOCs to form ozone. See Grumet, supra note 1, at 378.
30. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,330 (the OTAG process used an innovative approach to develop
“the most comprehensive analysis of ozone transport ever conducted”); 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,381382 (describing OTAG’s technical analyses, including its quantification of contributions). See
also OTAG Executive Report, supra note 28, at 1 (“OTAG improved the level of air pollution
science and information by an order of magnitude. . . .”).
31. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,332-33 (OTAG divided the 23-state region into twelve
“subregions” comprised of portions of multiple states and made conclusions about the
contributions from one multistate region to another, not any one state to another state).
32. Id.
33. OTAG recommended to EPA a whole range of emissions controls–ranging from no
controls beyond current requirements under the Clean Air Act to substantial controls on large
sources such as power plants. OTAG Executive Report, supra note 28, at 52-54.
34. Id. at 5.
35. 62 Fed. Reg. 60,331-36 (describing OTAG’s modeling, EPA’s method for analyzing the
results of OTAG’s modeling, and other information EPA used to determine significant
contributions); 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377, 57,387-89 (describing additional air quality modeling
EPA conducted after receiving comments).
36. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,387. EPA analyzed an upwind state’s contribution to exceedances of
the original one-hour ozone standard or the 1997 revised eight-hour ozone standard. Id. at
57,387-88. EPA’s findings based on the eight-hour standard, and the petitioners’ challenges to
those findings, were stayed after that standard was remanded in American Trucking Assn’s, Inc.
v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g granted in part and denied in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), cert. granted and reversed sub nom., Whitman v. American Trucking Assn’s Inc., 121
S. Ct. 903 (2001). See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 670-71 (describing stay of EPA’s eight-hour
findings and challenges thereto).
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significantly to ozone levels in downwind states.37 EPA’s review of the data
was informed by its notion of “collective contributions,” that is, a recognition
that, generally, ozone pollution is caused by the contributions of thousands of
relatively small, diverse sources over wide areas.38 Although no single source
might contribute significantly to ozone pollution in a downwind state, many
sources together certainly could do so.39 Similarly, while a single state’s
emissions, in absolute terms, might be contributing relatively small amounts of
ozone downwind, EPA determined that those emissions might nevertheless be
contributing significantly to another state’s ozone nonattainment when
combined with the emissions from other states.40 In addition, EPA examined
not only the amount of ozone contributed but also the frequency of a state’s
contributions. An upwind state, according to EPA, might be contributing
significantly to downwind ozone nonattainment if it contributed infrequent but
high amounts of ozone or frequent but low amounts of ozone to one or more
downwind states.41 Based on all of these determinations, and after reviewing
all the air quality modeling data, EPA concluded preliminarily, pursuant to
Clean Air Act section 110(a)(2)(D), that emissions from twenty-three upwind
states, primarily in the midwest and southeast, were contributing significantly
to ozone nonattainment in one or more downwind states.42
C. EPA’s Controversial Next Step: Consideration Of Pollution Control Costs
In an effort to ensure that the NOx SIP Call would be affordable for the
states to implement, EPA examined the costs of pollution control measures,
that is, the means available for pollution sources in a state to reduce NOx
emissions, and defined as “highly cost-effective” any control measure that
would eliminate one ton of NOx emissions at a cost of no more than $2,000.43

37. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,390-91.
38. Id. at 57,375-77.
39. Id. at 57,377 (“[T]he solution to the problem [of ozone transport] is the implementation
over a wide area of controls on many sources, each of which may have a small or unmeasurable
ambient impact by itself.”).
40. Id. at 57,392. For example, EPA explained that several relatively small ozone
contributions from several different states led to a substantial portion of New York City’s ozone
nonattainment. See id. at 57,391-92. In particular, except for the states in the immediate vicinity
of New York City, no upwind state contributed more than 5% of the total average ozone
contribution to that city. Yet together those upwind states contributed a total of 27% to the city’s
ozone nonattainment on average. Id. at Table II-3.
41. Id. at 57,391.
42. Id. at 57,394-98 (summarizing the results of EPA’s assessment of air quality modeling
data, described as the “first step” in EPA’s efforts to identify the upwind emissions that contribute
significantly downwind).
43. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377-78. Pollution control measures might include installing
equipment to burn fuels more efficiently (for example, using “low-NOx burners” or “overfire air”)
or installing post-combustion technologies to remove NOx from a source’s emissions (for
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EPA determined that out of the hundreds of pollution sources that a state might
regulate, highly cost-effective control measures were available for four: (1)
large boilers and turbines that generate electricity at power plants (“large
power plants”);44 (2) large boilers and turbines at industrial facilities (“large
industrial boilers”);45 (3) cement kilns; and (4) stationary internal combustion
engines (such as pipeline compressors).46
EPA then took an important–and controversial–next step. Rather than
relying on its preliminary determinations based on air quality modeling data
alone, EPA defined as “contributing significantly” only those upwind NOx
emissions that could be reduced using the highly cost-effective pollution
control measures for the four types of sources it had identified.47 More
specifically, for those four sources, EPA calculated the precise emissions
levels expected if they were operating with highly cost-effective control
measures, and only the emissions above those expected levels were deemed to
be contributing significantly to downwind ozone.48 Sources producing
emissions at or below those levels were not considered to be contributing

example, using “selective catalytic reduction” or selective noncatalytic reduction”). See id. at
57,447.
Just as OTAG had found that VOC emissions reductions would not help alleviate longrange ozone transport, so EPA also did not consider any VOC emissions to be significant
contributors to downwind states’ ozone nonattainment and did not consider the control costs of
VOC reductions. See supra text of note 29; 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,320. The Michigan court upheld
EPA’s decision not to give credit under the NOx SIP Call for VOC reductions. 213 F.3d at 688.
44. Technically, EPA refers to this category as “large electricity-generating units” (large
EGUs), which could include traditional, utility-owned power plants or other non-utility-owned
power generators. See Supplemental Notice for the Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 25,902, 25,923 (May 11, 1998) (explaining
that the deregulation of the power-generation industry has led numerous non-utility sources to
generate electricity). For ease, this article will refer to this category as “large power plants.”
45. Industrial boilers are one category of what EPA refers to as “non-EGUs,” 63 Fed. Reg. at
57,365, and can generate steam for a variety of uses within an industrial complex. See id. at
25,923.
46. Id. at 57,377-78, 57,399-402. EPA chose the figure of $2,000 because several recent
federal and state initiatives to control NOx emissions had cost, on average, a little less than
$2,000/ton of NOx removed. See id. at 57,400 & Table 1. EPA did not find any highly costeffective pollution controls for common NOx sources such as automobiles or municipal waste
combustors. Id. at 57,402-03.
47. Id. at 57,377-78.
48. Id. at 57,378. EPA only reviewed the control availability for emissions in the twentythree states that it had identified preliminarily based on air quality data alone. See id. (“Because
EPA had also determined that the NOx emissions from the affected upwind States have a large
and/or frequent impact on downwind nonattainment or maintenance problems, EPA concludes
that the amount of NOx emissions from those States that can be eliminated through application of
highly cost-effective control measures contributes significantly to nonattainment or maintenance
problems downwind.”).
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significantly to downwind ozone.49 For example, EPA had determined that a
large power plant, using highly cost-effective control measures, could limit
emissions to 0.15 pounds of NOx per million British Thermal Units (Btus) of
heat input (pounds/mmBtu).50 If a plant emitted NOx at a rate greater than
0.15 pounds/mmBtu, then only the emissions exceeding that level were
considered to be contributing significantly to downwind ozone.51 Not
considered to be significant were any NOx emissions originating from a power
plant emitting NOx at a rate of 0.15 pounds/mmBtu or less, or, for that matter,
any NOx emissions originating from the many sources for which EPA had not
specifically identified highly cost-effective control measures.52 NOx emissions
from automobiles, for example, were not deemed to be contributing
significantly to downwind ozone at all.53
EPA’s final definition of “contribute significantly” could easily be seen as
confusing two separate factors: first, based on scientific data, the actual amount
of ozone an upwind state was contributing downwind; and second, the types of
pollution sources in that state and whether highly cost-effective control
measures were available for them. Arguably, emissions are no less significant
if they originate from power plants (for which EPA had identified highly costeffective control measures) than emissions originating from automobiles (for
which EPA had not). Yet, under the NOx SIP Call, two states contributing the
same amount of ozone to downwind states, by EPA’s definition, nevertheless
could be contributing dramatically different “significant” amounts of ozone.
For example, if Indiana’s NOx emissions primarily were produced by large
power plants, while Kentucky’s primarily were produced by automobiles, then,
by EPA’s definition, Indiana’s emissions would be “contributing significantly”
to a much greater extent than Kentucky’s, even if both states contributed
equally, as shown by air quality data, to downwind ozone levels.54

49. Id. (“Because no highly cost-effective controls are available to eliminate the remaining
amounts of NOx emissions, EPA concludes that those emissions do not contribute significantly to
downwind nonattainment or maintenance problems.”)
50. Id. at 57,401-402. The heat input value of various fuels differs considerably; thus,
emissions limits are expressed as a factor of heat inputs. In determining the cost of NOx
reductions for large power plants, EPA assumed that the twenty-three covered states would
participate in an emissions trading program, whereby sources could buy and sell NOx emissions
reduction credits from state to state. Id. at 57,400.
51. See id. at 57,409-14 (calculating “emissions budgets” for each state assuming the
“applicable [NOx] emission rate” of 0.15 pounds/mmBtu). For a discussion of the state emissions
budgets, see infra text accompanying notes 80-86.
52. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,378.
53. Id. at 57,402-03.
54. This example–far simpler than the more complex facts addressed in the NOx SIP Call–
assumes that Kentucky’s emissions, in addition to originating from automobiles, also come from
at least a few large power plants, large industrial boilers, cement kilns, and/or stationary internal
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The petitioners in Michigan brought this apparent inconsistency to the
D.C. Circuit’s attention, suggesting that the NOx SIP Call did not accomplish
what should have been its primary goal, namely, reducing high levels of NOx
emissions that contributed to downwind ozone pollution without regard to the
types of sources creating those emissions.55 They argued that EPA’s definition
of “contribute significantly” improperly focused, not on whether sources in a
state, such as power plants, were actually contributing significant amounts of
ozone to downwind states, but rather on whether the power plants’ NOx
emissions levels were as low as levels at power plants that implemented highly
cost-effective control measures.56 Although the petitioners’ argument had
some common-sense appeal, the Michigan court paid little heed to this
practical concern, and instead focused on a more fundamental issue raised by
the petitioners: whether section 110(a)(2)(D) even allowed EPA to consider the
costs of pollution control measures in the first place.
D. EPA’s Statutory Authority To Consider Costs: The Petitioners’ Arguments
And The Court’s Decision
Before the Michigan court, the petitioners argued that the NOx SIP Call’s
definition of “contribute significantly” not only defied common sense, but also
violated the very terms of section 110(a)(2)(D) of the Clean Air Act. That
provision, they claimed, precluded EPA from incorporating the costs of
pollution control measures into its identification of significant upwind
emissions.57 Instead, EPA was required to rely primarily on air quality
modeling data.58
The Michigan court, however, disagreed. Writing for the majority, Judge
Stephen F. Williams, joined by Judge Judith W. Rogers, held that EPA, when
determining whether an upwind state’s emissions were contributing
significantly to downwind ozone nonattainment, permissibly considered
whether any highly cost-effective pollution control measures were available for
that state’s sources.59 Because, according to the court, the meaning of the
phrase “contribute significantly” in section 110(a)(2)(D) was ambiguous, it
required further interpretation by EPA,60 and under the “settled law of this
circuit,” EPA could consider economic factors, such as the costs of
implementing pollution control measures, to interpret such an ambiguous
combustion engines–the four categories targeted by EPA; otherwise, Kentucky would not have to
reduce any emissions under the NOx SIP Call.
55. See Final Brief of Petitioning States (“States’ Brief”), at 17-19, Michigan v. EPA, 213
F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1497) [hereafter States’ Brief].
56. Id.
57. Id. at 15-16.
58. Id.
59. 213 F.3d at 674-79.
60. Id. at 677-78.
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statutory phrase unless Congress has expressed its “clear . . . intent to preclude
[such] consideration.”61 The majority decided that nothing in the text of
section 110(a)(2)(D), the overall structure of the Clean Air Act, or the Act’s
legislative history indicated that Congress intended to bar EPA from
considering the costs that upwind sources might incur to implement pollution
control measures.62 Although Congress had not expressly authorized EPA’s
consideration of control costs under section 110(a)(2)(D), it had not expressly
precluded such consideration either. EPA, therefore, could exercise its
discretion under the statute.63
In dissent, Judge David B. Sentelle concluded that EPA did not have
discretion, under section 110(a)(2)(D), to consider the costs of pollution
control measures.64 He described EPA as a “creature of statute” with authority
to consider costs only if Congress expressly provides that authority.65 If

61. Id. (citing NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc); George E. Warren
Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154
F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998); NRDC v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
62. Michigan, 213 F.3d at 679 (summarizing conclusion regarding text, structure and history
of the Clean Air Act).
63. 213 F.3d at 679. The court also rejected a related claim about EPA’s findings of
significant contributions, namely, that EPA had exercised such unconstrained discretion in
determining which upwind emissions contributed significantly to downwind ozone nonattainment
that EPA had violated the nondelegation doctrine. See id. at 680-81. For this argument the
petitioners relied on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Trucking, in which the court held
that, pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine, an agency must identify a “determinate criterion,”
derived from the governing statute, to restrain the agency’s exercise of discretion. 175 F.3d at
1034. See generally Patricia Ross McCubbin, The D.C. Circuit Gives New Life and New
Meaning to the Nondelegation Doctrine in American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 19 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 57 (2000). In the challenges to the NOx SIP Call, the Michigan court held that EPA’s
benchmark of $2,000 for highly cost-effective pollution controls was not based on “anything in
the language or function of section 110(a)(2)(D)” of the Clean Air Act, and was “essentially
unbounded,” suggesting a violation of the nondelegation doctrine. See supra text accompanying
notes 43-46; 213 F.3d at 680. However, the Michigan court held that the nondelegation doctrine
only applies to agency actions that affect “all American enterprise,” and that, because the NOx
SIP Call applied to merely twenty-three states–just roughly “half of the nation”–the rule did not
have to satisfy the doctrine. Id. at 680-81. This conclusion–difficult to justify–is now irrelevant
because the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Trucking, holding
that the nondelegation doctrine does not serve as a constraint on agency discretion. 121 S. Ct. at
912-14.
64. 213 F.3d at 695. Judge Sentelle believed that EPA had authority to consider only air
quality-related information when identifying significant upwind emissions. Id.
65. Id. For this notion, Judge Sentelle relied on the Supreme Court’s statement that “it is
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited
to the authority delegated by Congress.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988).
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Congress remains silent, then an agency cannot, as the majority and EPA
suggested, infer that authority in its decisionmaking.66
E.

Analysis Of The Court’s Decision

One argument suggests support for Judge Sentelle’s position. In other
sections of the Clean Air Act, Congress expressly directs EPA to consider
costs. In section 111(a)(1), for example, Congress expressly directs EPA to set
“new source performance standards” based, in part, on “the cost of achieving
[an emissions] reduction.”67 One could reasonably conclude that had it
intended EPA to consider pollution control costs under section 110(a)(2)(D),
Congress would have similarly directed EPA to do so.68
Such a literal reading of the Clean Air Act, however, might fail to give
sufficient weight to the legislative history of the interstate pollution provisions
in the statute.69 Congress intended those provisions not only to improve overall

66. 213 F.3d at 695. Judge Sentelle’s dissent did not address the several prior D.C. Circuit
cases upon which the majority relied for the notion that EPA may consider costs unless Congress
clearly bars their consideration. See id. at 678 (citing NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc); George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Grand Canyon
Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998); NRDC v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641 (D.C.
Cir. 1991)). And the majority opinion did not address the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases
upon which Judge Sentelle relied for the opposite notion. Id. at 696-97 (citing Bowen, 488 U.S.
at 208; American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51
F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
This argument is buttressed by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in American
Trucking. There the Court noted the many different provisions of the Clean Air Act, including
section 111, under which Congress expressly has directed EPA to consider costs, and explained
that it will not “find implicit in ambiguous sections of the [Clean Air Act] an authorization to
consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted.” 121 S. Ct. at 909
(citations omitted). It held that section 109(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994), does not
grant EPA express authority to consider costs when setting national ambient air quality standards.
121 S. Ct. at 911. Interestingly, the Court distinguished section 110 and the Michigan decision
(along with a few other D.C. Circuit decisions), indicating that section 110 does not “share[] §
109(b)(1)’s prominence in the overall statutory scheme.” 121 S. Ct. at 910 n.1. In other words,
even though Congress did not expressly grant EPA authority to consider costs in section 110, the
Court apparently was not troubled by the Michigan court’s decision to allow EPA to do so
because section 110 is not a “prominent” part of the Clean Air Act.
69. Along with section 110(a)(2)(D), other provisions of the Clean Air Act also address
interstate pollution. Under section 176A, for instance, EPA may designate “transport regions”–
areas of the country that are affected by a common interstate air pollution problem–and may
establish a “transport commission” comprised of state representatives to recommend control
measures for the transport region. 42 U.S.C. § 7506a (1994). In section 184, Congress
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air quality but also to alleviate economic disparities between upwind and
downwind states.70 The legislature recognized that, historically, downwind
states had imposed more stringent pollution control requirements on their
emissions sources than had their upwind neighbors, thus imposing “a distinct
economic and competitive disadvantage” for those sources.71 Congress
intended “to equalize the positions of the States with respect to interstate
pollution by making a source at least as responsible for polluting another State
as it would be for polluting its own State.”72 The NOx SIP Call, therefore,
satisfied Congress’s intent by requiring upwind states to reduce their emissions
to levels already obtained by sources using highly cost-effective control
measures in downwind states.
An examination of the provision authorizing EPA to call SIPs for
violations of section 110(a)(2)(D) also supports the Michigan decision. Under
section 110(k)(5), EPA can require a state to “mitigate adequately” its

established one particular transport region: the Northeast Ozone Transport Region for twelve
northeastern states and the District of Columbia. Id. § 7511c(a) (1994). See also infra text of
note 87.
In addition, section 126 allows downwind states to petition EPA to impose limits directly
on upwind stationary sources that violate section 110(a)(2)(D). 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b)-(c) (1994).
While it was developing the NOx SIP Call, EPA received petitions under section 126 from several
northeastern states, requesting that EPA find that certain types of NOx-emitting sources in
specified upwind states were contributing significantly to nonattainment of the one-hour ozone air
quality standard in the downwind, petitioning states. Findings of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63
Fed. Reg. 24,058, 24059 (Apr. 30, 1998). EPA determined that sources of NOx located in twelve
states (Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia) and the District of Columbia contribute
significantly to nonattainment of the one-hour ozone standard in the downwind states of
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, and by a later rule, EPA imposed
federal NOx reduction requirements on those sources (the “Section 126 Rule”). See Findings of
Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing
Interstate Ozone Transport, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,250 (May 25, 1999); Findings of Significant
Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport, 65 Fed. Reg. 2674 (Jan. 18, 2000). Challenges to the Section 126 Rule are currently
pending before the D.C. Circuit in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA (No. 99-1200).
70. See S. Rep. No. 95-127 at 41 (1977), available at LEXIS, Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977 Legislative History, at 25 [hereinafter CAA77 Leg. Hist.] (Strong interstate pollution
provisions were needed to address the “serious inequities among several States, where one State
may have more stringent implement plan requirements than another State.”).
71. CAA Leg. Hist., supra note 70, at 25 (giving example of Ohio’s failure to adopt any
control measures for sulfur dioxide until 1976, resulting in increased sulfur dioxide emissions
transported to its downwind neighbor, West Virginia, which then had to impose “more stringent
control[s]”).
72. Id. at 42.
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contributions to “interstate pollutant transport,”73 and when determining which
state mitigation measures would be “adequate,” EPA can consider the costs
that a state would incur to reduce its emissions.74 Although the petitioners
maintained that EPA could not consider pollution control costs under section
110(a)(2)(D) when it identified which upwind emissions were significant, the
petitioners (and the court) agreed that EPA could have considered those costs
under section 110(k)(5) when it fashioned the remedy for violation of section
110(a)(2)(D) and determined the emissions reductions required of the states.
Perhaps if EPA had kept the two inquiries for its NOx SIP Call analytically
distinct–first, under section 110(a)(2)(D), using air quality data to identify
which NOx emissions were contributing significantly to downwind ozone
nonattainment, and second, under section 110(k)(5), considering whether
highly cost-effective control measures were available to reduce those
emissions–the end result would have been a less controversial application of
the Clean Air Act. The end result for the upwind states, however, would have
been the same: a requirement to reduce NOx emissions to a level reflecting the
use of highly cost-effective control measures.
IV. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE NOX EMISSIONS BUDGETS
A.

Implementing The Clean Air Act: The Roles Of States And EPA

The Clean Air Act establishes a scheme of “cooperative federalism” with
distinct roles for EPA and the states.75 To regulate ozone pollution, for
example, EPA sets air quality standards prescribing permissible levels of the
pollutant, while each state, by adopting a State Implementation Plan, has the
authority to choose which sources to regulate and which pollution control
measures to adopt in order to meet those levels.76 One state might require
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (1994). That provision does not expressly refer to section
110(a)(2)(D). Instead, it refers to “interstate pollutant transport described in section [176A] of
this title or section [184] of this title.” Sections 176A and 184, in turn, establish “transport
commissions” that may make recommendations to EPA to bring states into compliance with the
prohibition on contributions to interstate pollution established by section 110(a)(2)(D). See 42
U.S.C. § 7506a(b)(2) (1994) (interstate transport commission shall recommend to EPA “such
measures as the Commission determines to be necessary to ensure that the plans for the relevant
States meet the requirements of section 7410(a)(2)(D) of this title”); id. § 7511c(c)(5) (1994)
(EPA may make a finding in response to a recommendation from the Northeast Ozone Transport
Commission that a state’s SIP “is inadequate to meet the requirements of section 7410(a)(2)(D) of
this title”). See also infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
74. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,376; 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,325. See also 213 F.3d at 676-77 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (1994) and explaining petitioners’ concession that control costs could be
considered under that provision).
75. See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 1982).
76. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The federal government through the EPA
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emissions reductions from large industries or power plants, while another
might require reductions from a broad array of smaller sources that might
include dry cleaners, gas stations, or automobiles. Although it must review
each state’s SIP, EPA has no authority to question the state’s choices as long as
the SIP meets the requirements of the Clean Air Act.77 This careful balance
between federal and state authority is a key element of the statute,78 and the
eight states challenging the NOx SIP Call argued that EPA upset this balance
and violated the states’ rights when it assigned specific “emissions budgets”
for each state to meet.79
B.

EPA’s NOx Emissions Budgets

To determine the exact NOx emissions reductions required of each state by
the NOx SIP Call, EPA took an unprecedented step, assigning a mandatory
NOx emissions budget to each of the twenty-three upwind states that were,
according to EPA, contributing significantly to downwind ozone
nonattainment.80 Relying on its earlier assessment of pollution control costs,
EPA determined a state’s emissions budget by calculating what the state’s total
NOx emissions output would be if the state implemented the highly costeffective pollution control measures available for the four types of sources that
EPA previously had identified.81 To determine the NOx emissions budget for
Ohio, for example, EPA calculated that if Ohio were to require all of its large
power plants, large industrial boilers, cement kilns and stationary internal
determines the ends–the standards of air quality–but Congress has given the states the initiative
and broad responsibility regarding the means to achieve those ends through state implementation
plans and timetables for compliance.”) (citations omitted).
77. Train, 421 U.S. at 79. See also Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1976)
(The Clean Air Act “place[s] the primary responsibility for formulating pollution control
strategies on the States, but nonetheless subject[s] the States to strict minimum compliance
requirements.”).
78. See Mark Squillace, Cooperative Federalism Under The Surface Mining Control And
Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way To Run A Government?, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10039, 10039
(cooperation federalism is a hallmark of the Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes);
Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered Federalism: Can
Cooperative Federalism Models From Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?, 3 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 193, 199 (Winter 1996) (describing the “state primacy” or “dual
regulation” model of cooperative federalism found in various federal pollution control statutes).
79. See States’ Brief, supra note 55, at 34-40.
80. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377-78.
81. Id. at 57,403 (“The above discussion described the controls for various source categories
that EPA considers to be highly cost-effective. The next step in the process is to determine the
amounts of NOx emissions that would be eliminated by applying these highly cost-effective
controls to the respective source categories. The EPA considers those emissions to be the
amounts that contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by,
downwind States. By assuming that reductions of this magnitude should occur, EPA determined
the resulting State-specific ‘budget.’”).
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combustion engines to implement the highly cost-effective pollution control
measures identified by EPA, then Ohio’s overall NOx emissions would be
reduced from 372,626 tons per year to 239,898 tons per year.82 Consequently,
EPA set the NOx emissions budget for Ohio at 239,898 tons per year, requiring
Ohio to submit a SIP demonstrating that the state would meet that cap.83
It is important to understand that EPA did not dictate that the states
actually impose the highly cost-effective control measures on the four
pollution sources it had identified, but simply set mandatory, state-wide
emissions caps based on its calculations. Ohio, for example, in order to reduce
its NOx emissions to 239,898 tons per year, was not required to adopt the
specific pollution controls for the four sources identified by EPA, but was free
to obtain the necessary emissions reductions through whatever mix of control
measures on whatever sources it chose.84 The states challenging the NOx SIP
Call, however, argued that although EPA had not explicitly dictated which
control measures each state should implement, the assumptions made by EPA
when calculating the emissions budgets effectively dictated the states’
choices.85 For this argument, the petitioners relied on an earlier decision of the
D.C. Circuit in Virginia v. EPA.86
C. Petitioners’ Reliance On The Virginia Decision And The NOTC LEV Rule
Established by Congress in 1990, and composed of representatives from
thirteen northeastern states, the Northeast Ozone Transport Commission, or

82. Id. at 57,439 (showing total budget for Ohio of 239,898 as well as total budgets for the
twenty-two other covered states ); id. at 57,433-36, Table III-5 & Table III-7 (showing calculated
emissions levels in each state if EGUs (i.e., large power plants) and non-EGUs (i.e., industrial
boilers, cement kilns and stationary internal combustion engines) reduced their emissions to
EPA’s assumed control levels).
EPA revised the states’ emissions budgets (twice) after receiving comments about some
of the technical data EPA had gathered in the “emissions inventories” from which it calculated
the budgets. See Technical Amendment to the Finding of Significant Contribution and
Rulemaking for Certain States for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 64 Fed.
Reg. 26,298 (May 14, 1999); Technical Amendment to the Finding of Significant Contribution
and Rulemaking for Certain States for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 65
Fed. Reg. 11,222 (Mar. 2, 2000). The emissions inventories describe all the various sources of
emissions in a state. Based on EPA’s changes to the emissions inventories, Ohio’s revised budget
was set at 249,274 tons of NOx. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 11,225. Challenges to EPA’s budget
revisions are currently pending before the D.C. Circuit in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA (No.
99-1268).
83. Id. at 57,491-92 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.121(a)(1) & (e)(2)).
84. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,378 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,328).
85. States’ Brief, supra note 55, at 34-40.
86. Id. See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1407 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds,
116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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NOTC, serves as an advisory commission to EPA.87 In 1994, a majority of the
NOTC members voted to recommend that EPA require the thirteen NOTC
states to enact a “Low Emission Vehicle” (LEV) program to help reduce intraand interstate ozone pollution.88 Adopting the NOTC’s recommendation, EPA
issued the “NOTC LEV Rule,” which mandated that the NOTC states reduce
NOx and VOC emissions either by implementing the LEV program or by
implementing alternative controls.89 However, EPA’s NOTC LEV Rule
required a state implementing alternative controls to achieve NOx and VOC
reductions several times greater than the reductions expected if it implemented
the LEV program.90
The Commonwealth of Virginia, one of the NOTC states that had voted
against the recommendation, challenged the NOTC LEV Rule, claiming that
although it ostensibly allowed states the ability to choose alternatives, the rule
effectively mandated only one control measure, the LEV program.91 The D.C.
Circuit agreed, concluding that, because “only a very foolish state” would
choose to implement alternative controls that would require much greater
emissions reductions, EPA had not given the states any real alternatives to the
LEV program.92 Consequently, the court invalidated the NOTC LEV Rule.93
Because the NOTC LEV Rule represented EPA’s only other effort to
implement the good neighbor provision of section 110(a)(2)(D),94 the states

87. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(a) (1994). Those thirteen jurisdictions make up the Northeast Ozone
Transport Region (NOTR). Id. While Congress did not specifically include all of Virginia within
the NOTR, Virginia participates because the northern portion of that state lies within the
“Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area” that includes the District of Columbia. See
Virginia, 108 F.3d at 1401 n.2.
88. See Ozone Transport Commission; Recommendation that EPA Adopt Low Emission
Vehicle Program for the Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,914 (March 18,
1994). LEVs emit very few NOx and VOC emissions. Virginia, 108 F.3d at 1401-02. As the
Virginia case explained, the NOTC LEV program was modeled on the very stringent NOx and
VOC emissions limits of California’s LEV program. Id. at 1401.
89. Final Rule on Ozone Transport Commission; Low Emission Vehicle Program for the
Northeast Ozone Transport Region, 60 Fed. Reg. 4712, 4712-13 (Jan. 24, 1995).
90. Virginia, 108 F.3d at 1404-05 (explaining that if Virginia chose not to adopt the LEV
program and use alternative measures, it would have to reduce NOx emissions 3.5 times, and
VOC emissions 6.5 times, more than under the LEV program).
91. Virginia, 108 F.3d at 1398, 1404-05. See also id. at 1403-10 (analyzing whether EPA
exceeded its authority under section 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410).
92. Id. at 1404-05.
93. Id. at 1406-10 (applying Train, 421 U.S. at 60).
94. The NOTC LEV Rule, while issued pursuant to section 110(a)(2)(D), was formally
initiated by the states’ recommendation and was not initiated by EPA itself, as was the NOx SIP
Call. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 4716 (“EPA is approving the OTC’s LEV recommendation based on the
determination under sections 184(c) and [section] 110(a)(2)(D) of the Act that the recommended
LEV program is necessary throughout the OTR to bring certain OTR nonattainment areas into
attainment. . . .”) (emphasis added).
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challenging the NOx SIP Call in Michigan, mimicking the language in the
Virginia opinion, argued that “only a very foolish state” would choose to
implement pollution control measures other than those used by EPA to
calculate the state’s emissions budget.95 No state, they claimed, would seek
emissions reductions from any sources except those four types for which EPA
had identified highly cost-effective control measures, since choosing
alternative pollution control measures, by definition, would be more costly.96
D. Analysis Of The Court’s Decision
The Michigan court rejected the petitioners’ argument, holding that the
NOx SIP Call did not expressly require, or even effectively mandate, that the
states implement the highly cost-effective control measures for the four
sources identified by EPA.97 Distinguishing Virginia, the court explained that
while the earlier decision prohibited EPA’s adoption of a rule that left states
with only “unreasonable or impracticable” alternatives, it did not prohibit a
rule that gave states reasonable yet more costly alternatives.98 The court found
that, under the NOx SIP Call, states not choosing to implement the highly costeffective control measures identified by EPA still had reasonably costeffective alternative controls available, including, for example, programs to
reduce NOx emissions from automobiles.99 Moreover, states choosing
alternative controls would not be penalized with additional emissions reduction
requirements like those imposed by the NOTC LEV Rule.100 Instead, the
emissions budgets under the NOx SIP Call set one—and only one—emissions
reduction requirement for the state.101 Because “real choice exists for the

95. States’ Brief, supra note 55, at 39.
96. Id.
97. 213 F.3d at 685-88.
98. Id. at 688 (emphasis in original).
99. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,438 (e.g., vehicle inspection and maintenance programs and
reformulated gasoline program); 62 Fed. Reg. at 60,328 (“[O]ne State may choose to primarily
achieve emissions reductions from stationary sources while another State may focus on emissions
reductions from the mobile source sector.”) (cited in Michigan, 213 F.3d at 688) (emphasis
added). In addition, EPA had made no final determination about control costs for sources for
which it lacked sufficient information, but it anticipated that states with adequate information
could implement reasonably cost-effective control schemes. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,416-17.
100. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,369-70 (explaining that, unlike the Virginia case, states subject to the
NOx SIP Call “will have significant discretion to choose the appropriate mix of controls to meet
the emissions budget”). See also supra text accompanying notes 89-90 (explaining the additional
emissions requirements imposed by the NOTC LEV Rule if a state did not adopt the LEV
program).
101. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,492 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.121(e)(1)) (setting one
emissions budget for each of the twenty-three states).
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covered states,” the Michigan court concluded that EPA had not contravened
the cooperative federalism of the Clean Air Act.102
The Michigan court’s conclusion is supported by a more detailed
examination of EPA’s method for calculating the NOx emissions budgets.
Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, EPA had not identified the four sources
used in its budgets calculations as the only sources for which highly costeffective pollution control measures were available. Because it had averaged
the costs of control measures for all twenty-three upwind states, EPA
recognized that an individual state might find certain control measures costing
less than this average.103 For example, there are relatively few lime kilns
throughout all twenty-three states, and, on average, it would not be costeffective for most states to develop and implement regulations addressing so
few sources.104 However, for any state with several lime kilns, regulating them
could very well be a highly cost-effective option.105 Thus, contrary to the
petitioners’ claim, choosing alternative control measures to meet the emissions
budgets of the NOx SIP Call would not be, by definition, more costly.
V. CONCLUSION
Regulating interstate ozone pollution is a complicated task, requiring
sophisticated technical analyses to determine the degree to which one state’s
NOx emissions affect ozone levels in other states. For the NOx SIP Call, EPA
not only reviewed complex scientific data, but also developed a regulatory
mechanism that reflected the costs of pollution control measures that states
could reasonably adopt.
Although unprecedented and controversial, this approach was nevertheless
consistent, according to the Michigan court, with the good neighbor provision
of the Clean Air Act. The resulting emissions budgets, while appearing to
restrict the states’ choices, in fact, allowed each state sufficient flexibility to
implement a variety of pollution control measures, thereby preserving the
careful balance of authority mandated by the cooperative federalism of the
Clean Air Act.

102. 213 F.3d at 688.
103. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,399-400, 57,438.
104. Id. at 57,416. EPA also believed that cost-effective controls might be available for
several other types of sources, including medical waste incinerators, fiberglass manufacturers,
and fluid catalytic cracking units at petroleum refineries, but recognized that the numbers of these
sources were relatively small. Id.
105. Id. (acknowledging that “NOx controls may be available at costs less than $2,000 per ton
for lime kilns”). See also id. at 57,438 (“In individual States, emissions from such sources [in
categories with few numbers] could be a high percentage of uncontrolled emissions, and, thus, be
subject to efficient, cost-effective controls for that particular State.”).

